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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Cesar Sepulveda appeals contending that three of his constitutional rights have 
been violated. First, he asserts his right to confront witnesses against him was violated 
when the district court granted the State's motion to present the preliminary hearing 
testimony of the alleged victim, L.M., during his trial, as a result of her untimely, 
unrelated death. Specifically, he asserts that he was not afforded an adequate, full, and 
fair opportunity to cross-examine her during the preliminary hearing. As such, his 
convictions based on that improperly-presented testimony should be vacated. 
Second, Mr. Sepulveda contends his right to present a defense was violated 
when the district court determined the evidence of LM.'s history of drug use was 
irrelevant, and thus, prevented him from presenting a full defense to the jury. That 
evidence was relevant to L.M.'s credibility, bias, and motive in testifying. Thus, the 
order sustaining the prosecutor's relevance objection to the cross-examination of L.M. 
on her history of drug use (adopted by the district court when it allowed the preliminary 
, hearing testimony to be admitted as evidence) is erroneous. Similarly, the pretrial 
determination that the nature of L.M.'s death overdose on methamphetamine was 
irrelevant was also erroneous. As such, those decisions should be reversed and the 
convictions based on those rulings should be vacated. 
Third, Mr. Sepulveda contends that that his right to be free from double jeopardy 
under the Idaho Constitution was violated when the district court entered convictions 
and imposed sentence for the charges in the 2014 case. Specifically, he asserts that, 
under Idaho's pleading theory, the allegations in the Information in the 2014 resulted in 
one charge (attempting to influence a witness) being the means by which each of the 
1 
other two (attempting to violate a no contact order) were committed. He also asserts 
this rises to the level of fundamental error, and so, those convictions should be 
vacated 
Mr. Sepulveda also contends that, even if this Court determines these errors to 
be independently harmless, cumulatively, they demonstrate he was deprived of his right 
to a fair triaL In that case, this Court should still vacate his convictions. 
For any and all of these reasons, this Court should vacate Mr. Sepulveda's 
convictions and remand these cases for further proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
When officers responded to a neighbor's report of domestic violence, 
Mr. Sepulveda, sporting visible injuries and blood, opened the door. (Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.127-281; Tr., Vol.1, p.25, Ls.10-11, p.27, 
Ls.14-18.2) OfficerWudracki conducted a pat search of Mr. Sepulveda. (PSI, p.127.) 
As he did so, Mr. Sepulveda told Officer Wudracki that he had L.M.'s methamphetamine 
pipe and a baggie of methamphetamine that he had found in the house in his pocket. 
(PSI, pp.127-28.) He stated that, when he had found those items, he had confronted 
L.M. about her drug use and she had responded by assaulting him. (PSI, p.128.) He 
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file 
"Sepulveda 42758 psi." Included in this file are the PSI report and all the documents 
attached thereto, such as the police reports. 
2 The transcripts in this case are provided in four independently bound and paginated 
volumes. To avoid confusion, "Vol.1" will refer to the volume containing the transcript of 
the preliminary hearing in CR 2013-18132 (hereinafter, 2013 case). 'Vol.2" will refer to 
the volume containing the transcript of the preliminary hearing in CR 2014-1189 
(hereinafter, 2014 case). "Vol.3" will refer to the volume containing the transcripts of the 
pretrial hearings held on June 20, 2014, July 25, 2014, and August 8, 2014. "Vol.4" will 
refer to the volume containing the transcripts of the jury trial and the sentencing hearing. 
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also provided other explanations for his injuries, which he later admitted were attempts 
protect LM. from being arrested. (PSI, 128; Tr., Vol.4, p.366, Ls.7-24.) 
Inside, Officer Chally spoke with L.M. (PSI, p.96.) LM. maintained that there 
had been no physical violence by either Mr. Sepulveda or herself. (PSI, p.96.) Officer 
Chally felt that L.M. was attempting to downplay the incident to get the officers to leave. 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.208, Ls.15-19.) After consulting with Officer Wudracki, Officer Chally went 
back to L.M., relayed what Mr. Sepulveda had said, and told LM. that she would be 
going to jail unless she told Officer Chally what really happened (PSI, pp.96-97; 
Tr., Vol.4, p.212, Ls.4-8.) At that point, L.M. accused Mr. Sepulveda of attempting 
to strangle her. (PSI, p.96.) Officers then arrested Mr. Sepulveda. (PSI, p.116.) 
Mr. Sepulveda was ultimately charged, in the 2013 case, with attempted strangulation 
and injury to a child based on accounts that three of their children were present during 
the fight between L.M. and Mr. Sepulveda (R , pp.56-58.) A no contact order was 
entered prohibiting Mr. Sepulveda from contacting L.M. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.4, p.389, 
Ls.6-8 (Mr. Sepulveda admitting the existence of the no contact order).) 
Thereafter, a new case was filed alleging Mr. Sepulveda had placed calls from 
the jail asking two different people to contact L.M. on his behalf. (R., pp.277-79.) 
Specifically, the charges alleged: 
COUNT I 
That the Defendant, Cesar Antonio Sepulveda, on or between the 29th 
day of December, 2013[,] and the 14th day of January, 2014, in the 
County of Ada, State of Idaho, did willfully intimidate, influence, impede, 
deter, obstruct, or prevent, and or did attempt to intimidate, influence 
impede, deter, obstruct, or prevent [L.M.], a witness, potential, witness, 
and/or person the Defendant believes to be a witness, from testifying 
freely, fully, and truthfully in a criminal proceeding, to-wit: [the 2013 case] 
by asking another person and/or persons to speak with [L.M.] and ask her 
to tell the court that she injured herself, that the allegations of attempted 
strangulation are false, and/or that her medications are to blame for what 
happened, and/or to direct her not to appear for court. 
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COUNT II 
That the Defendant, Cesar Antonio Sepulveda, on or about the 30th day of 
December, 2013, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, attempted to have 
contact with [L.M.] in violation of a no contact order issued in [the 2013 
case] by calling [L.M.]'s sister and asking her to pass certain messages on 
to [L.M.]. 
COUNT Ill 
That the Defendant, Cesar Antonio Sepulveda, on or about the 30th day of 
December, 2013, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, attempted to have 
contact with [L.M.] in violation of a no contact order issued in [the 2013 
case] by calling a Lisa Cameron and asking her to contact [L.M.] on his 
behalf. 
(R., p.278.) The cases were ultimately consolidated. (See R., p.41.) 
L.M. testified at the preliminary hearing in the 2013 case. At the end of the direct 
examination, the prosecutor asked her: 
Q. I'm going to ask you a question that seems a little bit out of line here, 
but bear with me. Had you used methamphetamine that day? 
A No. 
Q. Okay. Did you have a pipe on your person that day? 
A. No. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.16, Ls.1-7.) On cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to explore 
this issue further, asking: "Now, you said you hadn't used any methamphetamine that 
day. Had you a few days prior to that?'' (Tr., Vol.1, p.17, Ls.7-9.) However, the 
prosecutor objected on grounds of relevance, and the magistrate sustained that 
objection. (Tr., Vol.1, p.17, Ls.11-16.) A similar objection was sustained in regard to 
defense counsel's attempt to inquire about L.M. 's history of self-abuse. (Tr., Vol.1, p.16, 
Ls.18-22.) However, unlike with the objection to L.M.'s history of drug use, defense 
counsel was offered the opportunity to lay additional foundation in regard to the line of 
questioning on L.M.'s history of self-abuse. (Compare Tr., Vol.1, p.16, L.18 - p.17, L.1; 
with Tr., Vol.1, p.17, Ls.7-18.) 
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Unfortunately, in the interim between the preliminary hearing and the jury trial, 
M. overdosed on methamphetamine and passed away. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.4, p.11, 
1 - p.12, L.9.) As a result, the prosecutor filed a motion requesting she be 
allowed to present L.M.'s preliminary hearing testimony to the jury. (R., pp.312-23.) 
Mr. Sepulveda objected, contending that he had not been afforded an adequate 
opportunity to cross-examine L.M. about issues impacting on her credibility, namely her 
history of drug use and her history of self-abuse. (Tr., Vol.3, p.27, L.1 - p.32, L.5.) The 
district court determined, in regard to the line of questioning about L.M.'s history of self-
abuse, defense counsel had been offered the opportunity to lay more foundation to 
show the relevance of that question, but had decided not to take advantage of that 
opportunity. (Tr., Vol.3, p.35, L.24 - p.36, L.12.) It did not make any particular ruling as 
to the line of questioning about L.M.'s history of drug use. (See generally Tr., Vol.3, 
p.34, L.5 - p.37, L.11 (the court's explanation of its decision); Tr., Vol.3, p.38, L.23 -
p.40, L.3 (clarification of the decision at Mr. Sepulveda's request).) As such, it granted 
the State's motion and allowed it to present the unredacted audio recording of L.M.'s 
preliminary hearing testimony. (Tr., Vol.3, p.37, L.11 (granting the motion to use the 
preliminary hearing testimony); Tr., Vol.3, p.51, L.6 - p.52, L.23 (discussing the 
procedure for admitting the preliminary hearing testimony); compare State's Exhibit 3 
(the audio recording); with Tr., Vol.1, p.1, L.7 - p.21, L.18 (the transcript of L.M.'s 
preliminary hearing testimony).) 
The prosecutor also moved to exclude any reference to the cause of L.M.'s death 
during the trial. (R., p.386 ("Motion in Limine Regarding the Suicide of [L.M.]").) 
Mr. Sepulveda objected insofar as the cause of death - overdose on methamphetamine 
- was relevant to his theory of defense: 
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Well, Your Honor, there's other evidence that she, at the time of this 
incident, had methamphetamine in her system and other drugs that 
weren't prescribed to her. So it's a common theme that on our side that 
perhaps if she were here, we would [be] tempted to expose that And so it 
does relate to this case, where she has a continued struggle with drug 
abuse, and that goes to the weight of her testimony. 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.13, L.20 - p.14, L.4.) The district court granted the State's motion over 
Mr. Sepulveda's objection. (Tr., Vol.4, p.14, L.21 - p.15, L.7.) However, it did agree to 
instruct the jury that L.M.'s death was unrelated to the issues pending in the trial. (See 
Tr., Vol.4, p.137, L.20 - p.138, L.2 (the instruction to the jury regarding L.M.'s death).) 
During the trial, Mr. Sepulveda was ultimately allowed to present some evidence 
as to L.M.'s mental health issues. (See generally Tr., Vol.4, p.322, L.11 - p.333, L. 7 
(testimony of Stacy Wright, L.M.'s counselor, as to L.M.'s symptoms of suicidal and 
homicidal ideations reported to Ms. Wright a few days before the incident with 
Mr. Sepulveda).) Additionally, during redirect of his testimony, Mr. Sepulveda 
was allowed to offer some evidence about L.M.'s drug use. (Tr., Vol.4, p.419, 
L.2 - p.421, L.17 (discussing the resolution of a series of objections addressed at side 
bar, whereby the evidence was determined to be admissible as the parties opened the 
respective doors to those facts).) 
During deliberations, the jury sent out several questions, including one which 
asked: "If an aggressor is choked by someone who is defending themselves, is the 
choking -- it actually says caulking but I'm sure it means choking -- a violation of the 
law?"3 (Tr., Vol.4, p.483, Ls.9-12.) The jury ultimately acquitted Mr. Sepulveda of the 
attempted strangulation, convicting instead on the lesser included misdemeanor of 
3 Some documents, such as the question sheets sent by the jury during deliberations, 
are missing from the record. Efforts to get copies of these documents from the district 
court are ongoing, and Mr. Sepulveda will file a motion to augment the record with those 
documents once they are received. 
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domestic battery. (R., p.404.) It convicted him as charged on the remaining counts. 
, pp.404-05.) 
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted that Mr. Sepulveda was facing 
potential deportation as a result of the felony conviction (intimidating a witness). 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.511, Ls.20-24.) The district court ultimately sentenced Mr. Sepulveda to a 
unified term of five years, with three years fixed for the felony conviction and concurrent 
six-month sentences for each of the misdemeanors. (R., pp.235, 457-58; Tr., Vol.4, 
p.521, L.20- p.522, L.19.) It also retained jurisdiction. (R., p.458.) Mr. Sepulveda filed 
notices of appeal timely from the judgments of conviction (R., pp.236-38, 463-65.) 
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ISSUES 
1 Whether the district court violated Mr. Sepulveda's constitutional right to confront 
the witnesses against him when it granted the State's motion to present L.M. 's 
preliminary hearing testimony during trial even though he had not been afforded 
an adequate opportunity to cross-examine L.M. 
2 Whether the district court violated Mr. Sepulveda's right to present a defense by 
not allowing him to present evidence challenging L.M.'s credibility based on its 
erroneous conclusion that the evidence was irrelevant. 
3. Whether the district court violated Mr. Sepulveda's constitutional right to be free 
from double jeopardy under the Idaho Constitution by entering convictions and 
imposing sentences for each charge in the 2014 case when one of those charges 
was alleged as the means by which each of the other two charges was 
committed. 
4. Whether the accumulated errors in this case require reversal even if this Court 
determines them to be individually harmless. 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Violated Mr. Sepulveda's Constitutional Right To Confront The 
Witnesses Against Him When It Granted The State's Motion To Present L.M.'s 
Preliminary Hearing Testimony During Trial Even Though He Had Not Been Afforded 
An Adequate Opportunity To Cross-Examine L.M. 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that a criminal 
defendant has "the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." 
U.S. Const amend VI. This protection means that a witness's testimonial statements 
will not be admissible as evidence at trial unless that witness is subjected to cross-
examination. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004); State v. 
Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, 528 (2014). When the State proposes to introduce the 
preliminary hearing testimony of a witness at trial, the statements are undoubtedly 
testimonial. Id. Thus, preliminary hearing testimony may only be used at a subsequent 
trial if the defendant was afforded an adequate opportunity to cross-examine that 
witness. Richardson, 156 Idaho at 528; State v. Mantz, 148 Idaho 303, 305-07 (Ct. 
App. 2009) (tracing the decisions which provide that the opportunity to cross-examine 
must be a full, fair, and adequate opportunity.) 
The determination of whether the defendant has been provided an adequate 
opportunity to cross-examine a witness during a preliminary hearing is dependent on 
the circumstances of each individual case. See Mantz, 148 Idaho at 307-10. One of 
the considerations is whether the scope of the defendant's inquiries is significantly 
limited by the magistrate. Mantz, 148 Idaho at 306 (discussing the decision in 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 166 (1970), which recognized this factor). This 
means that the defendant should not be prevented from questioning the witness about 
potential sources of bias or attacking the veracity of the witness's direct testimony: 
9 
"'Where the defendant has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness at a 
preliminary hearing, probing into areas such as bias and testing the veracity of the 
cross-examination, and thus, confrontation, within the meaning of the Sixth 
Amendment has been accomplished"' Richardson, 156 Idaho at 529 (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Who/aver, 989 A.2d 883, 904 (2010)). This is because the purpose 
of the Confrontation Clause is "that reliability [of testimony] be assessed in a particular 
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a 
judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence . . . , but about how 
reliability can best be determined." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62 (emphasis added). 
Thus, as the United States Supreme Court has long since explained, "[c]onfrontation ... 
forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the 'greatest legal engine ever 
invented for the discovery of the truth."' Mantz, 148 Idaho at 306 (quoting Green, 399 
U.S. at 158 (quoting 5 Wigmore § 1367)). 
To that point, "the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and 
important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination." 
State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 713 (1976). As such, in Mantz, the defendant had been 
permitted to question the witness "as to the accuracy of his story, [his] underage 
drinking, [his] desire for an adventure, [his] ability to recall the events of the evening due 
to alcohol consumption, and [his] motive [to testify falsely] due to the pressure he was 
under from his parents and the DUI [charge he was facing]." Mantz, 148 Idaho at 310-
11. Therefore, although the prosecutor's objection as to the relevance of a particular 
question may have been upheld, the defendant was not deprived of an adequate 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing. Id. 
10 
Similarly, in Richardson, the defendant was not deprived of an adequate 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness because: 
Richardson questioned Bauer on all relevant issues for cross-examination 
at trial: Bauer's recollection of the events in question, his agreement with 
the State to be a confidential informant in exchange for non-prosecution, 
his prior felony conviction, his drug addiction, and his relationship with 
Richardson. With these questions, Richardson inquired into Bauer's 
potential bias, his motive to testify falsely, the reliability and accuracy of 
his recollection of the controlled deliveries, and his credibility. 
Richardson, 156 Idaho at 529. Furthermore, the defendant in that case had not offered 
"any evidence of new and material information that he would have confronted Bauer 
with at trial." Id. at 529-30; cf Matnz, 148 Idaho at 307 (discussing the holding in 
Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 214 (1972), which identified this same factor)). Thus, 
although the cross-examination may not have been as detailed as the defendant in 
Richardson would have preferred, he still received an adequate opportunity to cross-
examine the witness as required by the Confrontation Clause. Richardson, 156 Idaho 
at 529-30. 
However, unlike the defendants in Richardson and Mantz, Mr. Sepulveda was 
not afforded the opportunity to question LM about potential sources of bias or motives 
to testify falsely. Notably, L.M. was asked on direct examination: 
Q. I'm going to ask you a question that seems a little bit out of line here, 
but bear with me. Had you used methamphetamine that day? 
A No. 
Q. Okay. Did you have a pipe on your person that day? 
A No. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.16, Ls.1-7.) As LM. was the first witness to testify at the preliminary 
hearing, these questions could only be meant to preempt certain questions the 
prosecutor expected the defense to ask LM. This is unsurprising as the police reports 
stated that officers had found a pipe and methamphetamine on Mr. Sepulveda, which 
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he had said actually belonged to L.M., and that, when he confronted her about her drug 
she physically assaulted him (PSI, 127-28 (Officer Wudracki's report).) Officer 
also testified that she felt L.M. was trying to downplay the whole situation in an 
attempt to get the officers to go away. (Tr., Vol.4, p.208, Ls.15-19.) She also noted a 
white film at the corners of L.M.'s mouth (Tr., Vol.4, p.205, Ls.8-10; see, e.g., State's 
Exhibit 13 (picture of L.M. which shows the white film).) Based on all that information, 
as well as the fact that Mr. Sepulveda showed visible injuries, Officer Chally told L.M. 
she would be going to jail. (Tr., Vol.4, p.212, Ls.4-8.) It was at that point that L.M. 
made accusations against Mr. Sepulveda; to that point, she had denied there was any 
physical contact by either of them. (PSI, pp.96-97.) 
As such, there were several significant points that the prosecutor would have 
justifiably expected defense counsel to explore regarding L.M.'s credibility, bias, and 
motive on cross-examination. After all as the Idaho Supreme Court has pointed out: 
'The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is 'always relevant as 
discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony."' White, 97 Idaho at 
713 (quoting "3A J. Wigmore, Evidence s 940, p.775 (Chadbourn rev. 1970)") 
(emphasis added). 
When defense counsel started to do precisely that and follow up on L.M.'s denial 
regarding using methamphetamine,4 the prosecutor, despite having asked L.M. about 
prior methamphetamine use herself, objected as to relevance of the inquiry. (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.17, Ls.7-16.) The magistrate sustained that objection. (Tr., Vol.1, p.17, L.16.) Unlike 
4 Defense counsel later explained that there was, in fact, evidence that L.M. had 
methamphetamine in her system the day of the incident despite L.M.'s denial of using 
methamphetamine on direct examination. (Compare Tr., Vol.4, p.13, Ls.20-23; with 
Tr., Vol.1, p.16, Ls.1-7.) 
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the State's previous objection to a question about L.M.'s history of self-abuse, 
Sepulveda was not invited to lay more foundation to try and show the relevance of 
inquiry in to M.'s history of drug abuse. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.16, 18 - p.17, L.18.) 
As such, the magistrate's ruling prevented Mr. Sepulveda from questioning L.M. about 
this source of bias and motive to testify falsely against him. This was erroneous, as the 
Idaho Supreme Court has expressly held that cross-examination into the witness's drug 
history as a source of potential bias is a relevant inquiry and the presence of such an 
inquiry indicates that the opportunity to cross-examine was adequate. Richardson, 156 
Idaho at 529 (noting that the defendant was allowed to cross-examine the witness on 
"his drug addiction); see also Mantz, 148 Idaho at 310-11 (indicating that the fact that 
the defense had been allowed to ask questions about the witness's history of underage 
drinking indicated the opportunity for cross-examination had been adequate). 
Additionally, defense counsel made an offer of proof as to the new material he 
would have confronted L.M. with at triaL He explained that LM.'s preliminary hearing 
testimony had involved denying the use of meth and "we weren't able to explore that 
further and perhaps develop more of a credibility issue." (Tr., Vol.3, p.29, Ls.18-23.) 
The district court did not address that issue at all in granting the State's motion to use 
the preliminary hearing testimony. 5 (See generally Tr., Vol.3, p.34, L.4 - p.37, L 11; 
5 The district court's decision focused on defense counsel's primary offer of proof - that, 
had they L.M.'s medical records, or, at least, adequate time and understanding of the 
contents thereof, they would have been able to develop a line of impeachment with 
L.M. regarding her mental health symptoms, which led to suicidal and homicidal 
ideations. (See generally Tr., Vol.3, p.27, L.1 - p.28, L.25 (defense counsel's offer of 
proof regarding the medical records).) The district court determined that, in that regard, 
defense counsel had been offered the opportunity to lay more foundation to show the 
relevance of that line of inquiry and decided to pursue an alternative line of cross-
examination. (Tr., Vol.3, p.35, L.22 - p.36, L.12.) However, there was no such 
opportunity to lay more foundation regarding L.M.'s drug issues; that line of inquiry was 
completely shut down. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.17, Ls.7-16 (the objection to L.M.'s drug 
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, Vol.3, p.38, L23 - p.40, L3.) Defense counsel subsequently added that there was 
evidence that LM. had methamphetamine and other unprescribed drugs in her system 
on day of the incident (Tr., Vol.4, p.13, Ls.20-23.) Thus, unlike Richardson, 
there was evidence of the lines of questioning that would have been pursued, but 
which the defense was not allowed to pursue in the preliminary hearing. This further 
demonstrates that the opportunity to cross-examine LM. at the preliminary hearing was 
not adequate to satisfy the Confrontation Clause's requirements. 
Rather, this case is more like White, where "[t]he trial judge . . cut off appellant's 
cross-examination on an important credibility issue before the issue could be properly 
developed." White, 97 Idaho at 713. The Idaho Supreme Court held that this "was 
error." Id. The Idaho Supreme Court also explained that the fact the defendant had 
been subsequently allowed to explore the issue to some extent during the trial was not 
sufficient to cure that error: "At the time defense counsel was stopped by the trial judge, 
he had elicited the fact of the strain in the relationship, but had not explored the extent 
of the strain, nor the effect of the strain on [the witness's] perception and 
motivations." Id. at 713 n.6 (emphasis added). Rather: 
While defense counsel later did again refer to the existence of a strain he 
was never allowed to develop that point. The standard for review of a 
denial of a confrontation right was set forth in Davis v. Alaska, [415 U.S. 
308 (1974)]: "Petitioner was thus denied the right to effective cross-
examination which 'would be constitutional error of the first magnitude and 
no showing of want of prejudice would cure it."' Appellant was denied an 
opportunity to fully develop the issue, and in light of the language in Davis, 
we find prejudice. 
issues); compare Tr., Vol.1, p.16, L18 - p.17, L.1 (the objection and offer to lay more 
foundation regarding the mental health issues).) 
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White, 97 Idaho at 713 n.6 (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318 (abrogated on other 
grounds)) (other internal citations omitted).6 
Mr. Sepulveda was given even less latitude than the defendant in White, 
although he, too, was ultimately allowed to present some evidence in that regard to the 
jury. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.4, p.419, L.2 - p.421, L.17 (discussing the objections addressed 
at side bar that led to the testimony about L.M 's drug use was determined to be 
admissible)); Tr., Vol.4, p.472, Ls.22-24 (the prosecutor arguing in her closing that 
L.M had admitted to using methamphetamine a few days before the incident7).) 
Nevertheless, the extent of L.M.'s drug use and the effect that use had on L.M.'s 
perception and motivations at the time of the fight, were the critical aspect of 
Mr. Sepulveda's theory of defense that were not presented to the jury. (See Tr., Vol.1, 
p.17, Ls.7-18.) Thus, the absence of such an opportunity to explore those "important 
credibility issue[s]" indicates the opportunity to cross-examination was not adequate. 
See White, 97 Idaho at 713. It was not full (the lines of examination were cut off), nor 
was it fair (the determination that the line of cross-examination was irrelevant was, as 
will be discussed further in Section 11, wrong as a matter of law) 
As a result, the use ot' L.M.'s preliminary hearing testimony at the trial was 
erroneous and violated Mr. Sepulveda's constitutional right to confrontation. Thus, his 
convictions based upon that improperly-presented testimony should be vacated. 
6 The internal citation to Davis indicates that emphasis was added to the quote, but the 
Westlaw copy of the opinion does not provide that emphasis. See White, 97 Idaho 713 
n.6. 
7 It is unclear how the prosecutor justified arguing that fact to the jury when her 
objection, which actually overlapped L.M.'s answer (see State's exhibit 3 at 7:43-7:52), 
and which was sustained, was designed to prevent that precise evidence from being 
admitted based on the prosecutor's assertion that such evidence was in as irrelevant. 
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11. 
The District Court Violated Mr. Sepulveda's Right To Present A Defense By Not 
Allowing Him To Present Evidence Challenging L.M.'s Credibility Based On Its 
Erroneous Conclusion That The Evidence Was Irrelevant 
Two rulings existed during the trial that prevented Mr. Sepulveda from presenting 
evidence in support of his theory of defense - that L.M. had been using drugs which 
impacted her behavior such that, when Mr. Sepulveda had found evidence of that drug 
use and confronted L.M., she attacked him. The first was the ruling that 
cross-examination of L.M. as to her history of drug use was irrelevant (Tr., Vol.1, p.17, 
Ls. 7-16) and the second was that the cause of L. M .'s death ( overdosing on 
methamphetamine) was irrelevant (Tr., Vo14, p.15, Ls.3-7). Both of those decisions are 
erroneous since a witness's history of drug use is relevant to the issues of bias and 
credibility. See, e.g., Richardson, 156 Idaho at 529; Mantz, 148 Idaho at 310-11. 
A. As A Preliminary Matter, Mr. Sepulveda May Properly Challenge The Ruling On 
The State's Objection During L.M.'s Testimony As Though It Were An Evidentiary 
Ruling By The District Court 
The unique facts surrounding L.M.'s "trial testimony" created a situation where 
the district court had to adopt, as a substantive ruling on the evidence, the magistrate's 
determination that cross-examining L.M. on her history of drug use was irrelevant. As 
such, Mr. Sepulveda may challenge the propriety of that ruling on appeal. See, e.g., 
State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998) 
L.M.'s preliminary hearing testimony was presented verbatim via an audio 
recording and was introduced for the truth of the matters asserted therein. Therefore, it 
was being heard as though it were live testimony, as was the district court's design. 
(Tr., Vol.3, p.51, L.6 - p.52, L.23.) Thus, the jury heard the question about L.M.'s history 
of drug use, as well as the State's relevancy objection. ( See State's Exhibit 3.) In fact, 
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the prosecutor indicated that she would have raised that same objection had L.M been 
giving live testimony at the trial (Tr., Vol 3, p.33, Ls.1 3.) As a result, the district 
court would have had to rule on the State's objection as it would an objection raised 
during any other witness's testimony. Cf. 40 A.L.R.4th 514 (explaining that the general 
rule is that prior testimony admitted in lieu of live testimony is subject to all proper 
objections to admissibility at the trial which could have been raised a the time the 
testimony was given). As the only discussion was defense counsel's assertion at the 
preliminary hearing that the line of questioning was relevant (see Tr., Vol.1, p.17, Ls.12-
13; see generally Tr., Vol.4, p.162, L.18 - p.163, L.24), the district court necessarily had 
to have adopted the magistrate's ruling on the State's objection as its own 
Though this appears to be an issue of first impression in Idaho, the conclusion 
that the district court can and did adopt the magistrate's decision as its evidentiary ruling 
on the matter is consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent in the related 
scenario of what authority a successor judge has vis-a-vis rulings made by the judge he 
succeeds on a particular case: 
"As most commonly defined, the doctrine [of law of the case] posits that 
when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to 
govern the same issues in subsequent stages of the same case" .... Colt 
is correct that the doctrine applies as much to the decisions of a 
coordinate court in the same case as to a court's own decisions. Federal 
courts routinely apply law-of-the-case principles to transfer decisions of 
coordinate courts. 
Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 815-16 (1988) (quoting 
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983) (dictum)) (other internal citations 
omitted). "Under this rule, a court should not reopen issues decided in earlier stages of 
the same litigation. The doctrine does not apply if the court is 'convinced that [its prior 
decision] is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice."' Agostini v. Felton, 
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521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997) (quoting Arizona, 460 U.S. at 618 n.8). Thus, as the Seventh 
has summarized: 
The authority of a district judge to reconsider a previous ruling in the same 
litigation, whether a ruling made by him or by a district judge previously 
presiding in the case, ... is governed by the doctrine of law of the case, 
which authorized such reconsideration if there is a compelling reason, 
such as a change in, or clarification of, law that makes clear that the 
earlier ruling was erroneous. 
Santamarina v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 466 F.3d 570, 571-72 (7th Cir. 2006); see also 
Chiu v. United States, 948 F.2d 711, 717-18 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the successor 
judge has the authority to review a decision by a prior Judge in as much as the prior 
judge had authority to reconsider his own decisions). 
Since the district court in this case had the authority to enter a different ruling on 
the State's objection, but did not do so, it impliedly entered the same ruling when the 
same objection was, in effect, raised again during L.M.'s "trial testimony." 
B. The District Court Erred In Concluding The Evidence About L.M.'s History Of 
Drug Use Was Irrelevant 
As defense counsel argued, the evidence of L.M.'s drug use was relevant to 
Mr. Sepulveda's theory of defense: 
Well, Your Honor, there's other evidence that she, at the time of this 
incident, had methamphetamine in her system and other drugs that 
weren't prescribed to her. So it's a common theme that on our side that 
perhaps if she were here, we would [be] tempted to expose that. And so it 
does relate to this case, where she has a continued struggle with drug 
abuse, and that goes to the weight of her testimony. 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.13, L.20 - p.14, L.4.) Additionally, Mr. Sepulveda had, from the outset, 
maintained that he had found L.M.'s drugs and paraphernalia, confronted her about 
those items, and been battered by L.M. as a result. (See, e.g., PSI, pp.127-28 (Officer 
Wudracki's report noting that was Mr. Sepulveda's primary account of the incident); 
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, Vol.4, p.366, Ls.7-24 (Mr. Sepulveda explaining that he offered other suggestions in 
an effort to protect L.M. from arrest).)8 Therefore, part of his defense was that L.M. was 
primary aggressor and her version of events was factually untrue. 
To that point, the Idaho Supreme Court has held· "Evidence that goes to the 
credibility of the complaining witness is normally admitted under a broad standard." 
State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 13 (2013); cf White, 97 Idaho at 713 ("This court has 
consistently held that where a defendant is seeking on cross-examination to show bias 
or test the credibility of the complaining witness, the trail court should allow considerable 
latitude."). Thus, to have an adequate opportunity to cross-examine a witness, the 
defendant should be allowed to explore issues of credibility. See, e.g., Richardson, 156 
Idaho at 529; Mantz, 148 Idaho at 310-11 That is particularly true in cases like th is 
where there are directly inconsistent versions of events and the jury is called to decide 
which of the witnesses is credible. 
However, the district court determined that the subject of L.M.'s source of a 
motive to lie was irrelevant. (Tr., Vol.1, p.17, Ls.7-16 (sustaining the prosecutor's 
relevance objection to cross-examination on this point), Tr., Vol.4, p.15, Ls.3-7 ("the 
cause of death just doesn't have anything to do with anything in term of Mr. Sepulveda's 
guilt or innocence of the charges against him ").) However, those decisions were 
8 As Officer Chally testified, it is not uncommon for victims of domestic abuse to not 
disclose facts to police in an effort to protect their significant other. (Tr., Vol.4, p.227, 
Ls.3-7.) While she was offering this testimony to explain the inconsistencies in L.M.'s 
statements to police, it applies with equal force to Mr. Sepulveda's alleged inconsistent 
statements. In fact, as Officer Chally testified, she was preparing to arrest L.M. when 
L.M.'s story changed. (Tr., Vol.4, p.212, Ls.4-8.) Combined with the fact that 
Mr. Sepulveda's story has stayed relatively consistent in regard to the impetuous of the 
fight, and the fact that the jury specifically asked if Mr. Sepulveda could be guilty if his 
actions against L.M. were made to defend himself (Tr., Vol.4, p.483, Ls.9-12), the 
record actually indicates that Mr. Sepulveda's account of the fight and its impetuous 
was the more credible of the varying accounts presented to the jury. 
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contrary to Idaho Supreme Court precedent: "The partiality of a witness is subject to 
exploration at trial, and is 'always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the 
weight of his testimony."' White, 97 Idaho at 713 (quoting "3A J. Wigmore, Evidence s 
940, p.775 (Chadbourn rev. 1970)") (emphasis added). The facts about L.M.'s drug use 
and the impact on her behavior give her a motive to lie to protect herself. That makes it 
more likely that L.M.'s version of events was inaccurate, and thus, more likely that 
Mr. Sepulveda's version of events was accurate. Under his version of events, he was 
the victim (i.e., not guilty). Thus, the extent of L.M.'s drug use and its impact on her 
behavior are relevant to the question of Mr. Sepulveda's guilt or innocence. 
Additionally, the fact that the overdose occurred after the events in questions 
does not make that information irrelevant in this case; it is still relevant to the nature of 
L.M.'s drug use and the impact it had on her behavior, and so, builds on her motive to 
lie to try to protect herself. It is important to remember here that the threshold for 
relevancy is low. See, e.g., Joy, 155 Idaho at 9 (discussing LR.E. 401). This 
conclusion is particularly evident in this case, since the district court ruled the State 
could inquire about incidents occurring after the incident in question to try to refute the 
evidence tending to impeach L.M offered by her counselor. (Tr., Vol.4, p.319, Ls.5-16.) 
Thus, by not allowing Mr. Sepulveda to present this evidence of L.M.'s history of 
drug use and way it impacted her behavior prevented him from fully presenting his 
defense to the jury. As such, his due process right to present a defense was violated. 
The right to present a defense, which includes offering testimony of witnesses and 
presenting the defense's version of the facts so that the jury '"may decide where the 
truth lies"' is a "'fundamental element of due process of law.'" State v. Meister, 148 
Idaho 236, 239 (2009) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)). The 
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Rules of Evidence govern the admission of such evidence. Id. at 241 Thus, a 
defendant does not have a right to present irrelevant information, and there may also be 
cases, such as those arising under I. 412, where he will not have the right to 
present otherwise-relevant information Id. However, the general rule is that the 
defendant "should be afforded the opportunity to present his complete and full defense, 
which includes the presentation of all relevant evidence in the context of trial pursuant to 
any limitations of the Idaho Rules of Evidence." Id. 
In this case, Mr. Sepulveda was seeking to present relevant evidence - namely, 
evidence that L.M.'s version of events was false and that her credibility should be 
questioned. Since evidence of a witness's credibility is relevant under a broad 
standard, Mr. Sepulveda should have been allowed the opportunity to present his full 
defense, which included presenting this evidence challenging L.M.'s credibility, at the 
trial. See Joy, 155 Idaho at 13; White, 97 Idaho at 713. 
To this point, this case is similar to State v. Karpach, wherein the Court of 
Appeals determined that the defendant had been deprived of his rights in presenting his 
defense when the district court's rulings prevented him from calling a witness and 
admitting documents which were both relevant to contradict the evidence offered by the 
State's only eyewitness. 9 State v. Karpach 146 Idaho 736, 739-41 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(called into question on other grounds by State v. Wilson, 158 Idaho 585, 589 n.2 
9 The Court of Appeals' analysis was focused primarily on the right to offer testimony 
which is grounded in the Compulsory Process Clause. See Karpach, 146 Idaho at 739. 
However, the analysis in that decision is still relevant since it was also addressing the 
decision to prevent the defendant from presenting documents which would fall under the 
business records exception to the hearsay rule (I.R.E. 803(6)). Id. at 740-41. Thus, it is 
representative of appropriate analysis as identified by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Meister, which is to determine the admissibility of evidence under the Rules of 
Evidence, and allow the defendant to present a full defense accordingly. Meister, 148 
Idaho at 241. 
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(Ct App. 2015)). Similarly, Mr. Sepulveda was seeking to present evidence 
the testimony of the only eyewitness. Thus, the district court's decisions 
prevented him from presenting that evidence prevented him from presenting his 
defense in violation of his constitutional rights. Therefore, his convictions obtained in 
violation of those rights should be vacated. 
111. 
The District Court Violated Mr. Sepulveda's Constitutional Right To Be Free From 
Double Jeopardy Under The Idaho Constitution By Entering Convictions And Imposing 
Sentences For Each Charge In The 2014 Case When One Of Those Charges Was 
Alleged As The Means By Which Each Of The Other Two Charges Was Committed 
A The Idaho Courts Apply The Pleading Theory Analysis To Claims Of Double 
Jeopardy Violations Arising Under The Idaho Constitution 
The Idaho Constitution contains a prohibition of double jeopardy that is 
co-extensive in scope with the prohibition in the United States Constitution. 
State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho at 619, 624 (Ct App. 2001 ). Thus, the protections 
provided under each constitution may be violated in three ways: (1) engaging in a 
second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal has been entered, (2) 
engaging in a second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction has been 
entered; or (3) imposing multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. 
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980); McKeeth, 136 Idaho at 622. 
However, while the scope of the two rights may be co-extensive, Idaho employs 
its own test under its constitution for determining whether two charges are, in fact, for 
the same offense. See, e.g., State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 841 (2013); 
State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 658 n.3 (Ct App. 2014). Under the federal constitution, 
the courts use the "statutory theory" of analysis derived from Blockburger v. United 
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States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). Under that approach, the courts analyze the statutory 
elements of the two alleged crimes and determine whether each contains an element 
that the other does not. Id. at 304. If there is not that bilateral uniqueness, then a 
conviction for both offenses will violate the federal protection against double jeopardy. 
Id. 
However, under Idaho's "pleading theory," the courts analyze the charging 
document to determine whether one of the charges is "'necessarily committed in the 
commission of another offense; or one, the essential elements of which are charged in 
the information as the manner or means by which the offense was committed.'" 10 
State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 434 (1980) (quoting State v. Hall, 86 Idaho 63, 69 
(1963)). Thus, as the Court of Appeals has explained, a double jeopardy violation 
would occur under Thompson in a case where the defendant was charged with eluding 
and reckless driving when "[t]he means by which Corbus eluded the police-driving in 
excess of 100 mph, passing other vehicles, turning off his headlights after sunset, and 
endangering the person or property of another-are the same means by which Corbus 
drove recklessly." State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 375 (Ct. App. 2011). 
In Corbus, the Court of Appeals determined that the defendant, though showing 
a violation under Thompson, had failed to show fundamental error because the law in 
terms of the proper application of Thompson was in doubt due to conflicting Idaho 
Supreme Court precedent. 11 See id. at 375-76. However, since Corbus, that question 
10 The United States Supreme Court identifies the constitutional floor; states are allowed 
to provide additional protections under their own constitutions. See, e.g., 
State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 471 (2001) (discussing this concept as it relates to the 
Fourth Amendment). 
11 A defendant may raise an issue for the first time on appeal as fundamental error if he 
shows (1) the error violated an unwaived constitutional right, (2) the error is clear from 
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has been settled Notably, the Idaho Supreme Court strictly applied the Thompson 
pleading theory in McKinney, 153 Idaho at 841. See also State v Moffat, 154 Idaho 
532 App. 2013) (noting that this distinction was recognized by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in State v Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 529 (2011 )). Thus, the Court of 
Appeals has explained: 
In a subsequent case, however, the Idaho Supreme Court has again 
applied the Thompson pleading test to a double jeopardy claim 
arising under the Idaho Constitution, without mentioning the statutory 
elements test As McKinney is the Idaho Supreme Court's most recent 
pronouncement on the issue and reiterated only the pleading theory 
following this Court's explication of the confusion in Idaho law on the 
subject, we conclude that it is only the pleading theory that is to be applied 
in addressing a double punishment claim under the Idaho Constitution. 
Moad, 153 Idaho at 658 n.3 (internal citations omitted); cf. Moffat, 154 Idaho at 532 n.2. 
The continuing validity of the Thompson test is also evident from the Idaho Supreme 
Court's subsequent decision in State v. Sanchez-Castro, where the Court analyzed the 
defendant's double jeopardy claim under both constitutions under both the Blockburger 
statutory theory and the Thompson pleadings theory. See State v Sanchez-Castro, 
157 Idaho 647, 648-49 (2014). 
B. The Violation Of Mr. Sepulveda's Right To Be Free From Double Jeopardy Rises 
To The Level Of Fundamental Error 
In this case, Mr. Sepulveda contends that the Idaho Constitution's protections 
against double jeopardy were violated by the duplicative convictions in the 2014 case. 
He also contends that this violation rises to the level of fundamental error. 
As in Corbus, the language in the charging document demonstrates that the 
means by which the Information alleged the intimidating the witness charge was the 
the record, and (3) there is a reasonable possibility the error was not harmless. State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). 
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same as the means for each of the other two charges. 12 Therefore, there is a violation 
of one of Mr. Sepulveda's unwaived constitutional rights. Specifically, the intimidating a 
witness charge alleged Mr. Sepulveda had attempted intimidated or influenced L.M. 
from testifying in the 2013 case13 "by asking another person and/or persons to speak 
with [L.M.] and ask her to tell the court that she injured herself, that the allegations of 
attempted strangulation are false, and/or that her medications are to blame for what 
happened, and/or to direct her not to appear for court." (R., p.278.) Similarly, Count II 
alleged Mr. Sepulveda attempted to violate the no contact order "by calling [L.M.]'s 
sister and asking her to pass certain messages on to [L.M.]." (R., p.278.) Likewise, 
Count Ill alleged Mr. Sepulveda attempted to violate the no contact order "by calling a 
Lisa Cameron and asking her to contact [L.M.] on his behalf." (R., p.278.) As such, the 
means by which the intimidating the witness charge was alleged was the same as each 
of the charges alleging an attempt to violate the no contact order - contacting a person 
12 To avoid confusion, Mr. Sepulveda is not claiming that the two charges alleging 
attempt to violate the no contact order overlap with each other. Rather, Count I (the 
intimidating a witness charge) overlaps with Count II, and Count I overlaps separately 
with Count Ill. In both instances, Mr. Sepulveda's right to be free from double jeopardy 
is violated. 
13 The information originally charged included language indicating it was an attempt to 
intimidate that was being charged. (See R., p.278.) However, the district court 
subsequently struck that language from the Information based on the fact that the 
attempt language has been removed from the statute. (See Tr., Vol.3, p.47, L.10 - p.48, 
L.13.) As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, "it is the defendant's actions 
combined with an intent to intimidate a witness in a criminal proceeding, not the effect 
on the witness, that constitutes the crime .... There is no requirement that the 
defendant is ultimately successful in his efforts." State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 110 
(2006). Thus, the intimidation statute effectively includes attempts to intimidate, as 
Mr. Sepulveda was charged with doing. (See R., p.278.) 
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and asking them to contact L.M. on the defendant's behalf. 14 Compare Corbus, 151 
Idaho 374-75. 
As pied, Mr. Sepulveda is alleged to have attempted to violate the no contact 
order in two instances, each time by trying to influence L.M.'s testimony. (R., p.278.) 
Thus, the intimidating charge is the means by which each attempt to violate the no 
contact order charges were committed. As a result, the duplicative punishment for the 
intimidating a witness charge violated the Idaho Constitution' protection against double 
jeopardy. Compare Corbus, 151 Idaho at 374-75. There is no evidence in the record 
that Mr. Sepulveda waived his right to be free from double jeopardy. (See generally 
R., Tr.) Therefore, as in Corbus, he has satisfied the first prong of the Perry 
fundamental error test. 
14 The fact that the articulated means in Count I is not identical to the language in either 
Count II or Count Ill is of no import In Corbus, the Court of Appeals found a violation 
under Thompson even though the language in the two charges was not identical: 
The information charging Corbus with eluding a police officer stated: 
[Corbus] willfully attempted to elude a pursuing police 
vehicle after being given a visual signal to stop, and in so 
doing ... traveled ... in excess of 100 m.p.h. [or] ... drove his 
vehicle in a manner as to endanger or be likely to endanger 
the property of another or the person of another, to-wit: the 
Defendant drove in a reckless manner including speeding in 
excess of 100 m.p.h., passing other vehicles, and turning off 
his headlights after sunset .... 
The information charging Corbus with reckless driving stated: 
[Corbus drove] carelessly and heedlessly; without due 
caution and circumspection and/or at a speed or in a manner 
to be likely to endanger persons or property; by driving in 
excess of 100 m.p.h. with his headlights turned off after 9: 18 
p.m., with other vehicles on the roadway .... 
Corbus, 151 Idaho at 375. Thus, where the charging document articulates the same 
overarching means, even if a different level of specificity existed as to the facts of 
individual charges, there is still a violation under Thompson. See id. 
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As discussed in depth supra, the law regarding the continued applicability of the 
Thompson pleading test is now clear the Thompson pleading theory controls the 
under the Idaho Constitution's protection against double jeopardy. See, e.g., 
Moad, 153 Idaho at 658 n.3. The facts of the error, also discussed in depth supra, are 
also clear - the Information alleges multiple crimes based on the same means, which is 
improper under Thompson. Thus, the error is clear from the record, and so, 
Mr. Sepulveda has satisfied the second prong of the Perry analysis. 
Finally, in the double jeopardy context, the harm caused by the violation is self-
evident In this case, Mr. Sepulveda has three convictions on his record, one of them a 
felony, for the same criminal activities. That, by itself, shows the harm. However, the 
harm caused by the violation is particularly evident in Mr. Sepulveda's case because, as 
defense counsel pointed out at sentencing, Mr. Sepulveda is facing potential 
deportation as a result of the felony conviction in this case. (Tr., Vol.4, p.511, Ls.20-24.) 
Therefore, the harm caused by the unconstitutionally-duplicative convictions in the 2014 
case is exponentially greater in this case than in the traditional double jeopardy 
scenario. As a result, Mr. Sepulveda has satisfied the third prong of the Perry analysis. 
As such, Mr. Sepulveda has shown the violation of his Idaho Constitutional 
right to be free from double jeopardy constitutes fundamental error. 
C. Remedy 
Therefore, since the intimidating a witness charge was the means by which each 
of the two attempt to violate the no contact order charges were committed, it should be 
subsumed into those convictions, and thus, the conviction for intimidating a witness 
should be vacated. See Thompson, 101 Idaho at 436 (affirming the order dismissing 
the included charge). 
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IV. 
The Accumulated Errors In This Case Require Reversal Even If This Court Determines 
Them To Be Individually Harmless 
Even if this Court determines that each of the errors discussed supra was 
harmless by itself, this Court should still vacate Mr. Sepulveda's convictions based on 
the accumulation of errors. 15 See, e.g., State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 572-73 (2007). 
The accumulation of independently-harmless errors may still deprive the defendant of 
his right to a fair trial. Id. In those situations, the convictions should still be vacated 
pursuant to the cumulative error doctrine. See Field, 144 Idaho at 572-73. In order to 
find cumulative error, the appellate court must first find more than one instance of error. 
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 287 (2003). Additionally, "[e]rrors in the admission of 
evidence will be deemed harmless if the appellate court is able to say, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the same result absent the 
errors."16 Id. 
15 As to the violation of the protection against double jeopardy argued under the 
fundamental error doctrine, see Section Ill, supra, "'alleged errors at trial, that are not 
followed by a contemporaneous objection, will not be considered under the cumulative 
error doctrine unless said errors are found to pass the threshold analysis under [the] 
fundamental error doctrine."' State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 149 (2014) (quoting Perry, 
150 Idaho at 230)). However, even if the arguments made under the fundamental error 
framework are not subject to the cumulative error analysis, the two errors that were 
preserved for appellate review, see Sections 1-11, supra, are properly reviewed for 
cumulative error. 
16 Considering whether the verdict would have been the same "absent the errors" is 
not technically an accurate description of the relevant analysis. See, e.g., 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993); State v. Thomas, 157 Idaho 919 
(2014). As the United States Supreme Court has explained: 
The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without 
the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether 
the guilty verdict in this trial was surely unattributible to the error. This 
must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact 
rendered-no matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict 
might be-would violate the jury-trial guarantee. 
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This case is like Field in the application of the cumulative error doctrine. In Field, 
Supreme Court found several instances of independently-harmless prosecutorial 
misconduct but which, when aggregated with other errors found on appeal, were not 
harmless. Field, 144 Idaho at 571-73 Therefore, it reversed the judgment of 
conviction. Id. at 572-73. Similarly, in this case, there are several instances of error, 
and there is a reasonable probability that the accumulated errors contributed to the 
Mr. Sepulveda's convictions. This is particularly true in regard to the conviction for 
domestic battery because the jury was apparently inclined to believe Mr. Sepulveda's 
version of events, in that L.M. was the primary aggressor, but was unable to fully 
discount her version of events. (See Tr., Vol.4, p.483, Ls.9-12.) Thus, there is a 
reasonable possibility that the combined effect of allowing L.M.'s insufficiently-
challenged testimony, along with the inability to present evidence of the extent and 
impact of L.M.'s history of drug use contributed to the jury's decision to convict despite 
partially believing Mr. Sepulveda's version of events. 
As a result, even if all those errors are found to be independently harmless, this 
Court should still vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this case for a new trial 
because the accumulated errors deprived Mr. Sepulveda's of his right to a fair trial. 
Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279. If the State does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
there was no such possibility, then the error was not harmless. Id.; see also 
State v. Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 953 (Ct. App. 2012) (applying the harmless error 
test's rationale while evaluating a case for cumulative error). 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Sepulveda respectfully requests this Court vacate his convictions and 
remand these cases for further proceedings, 
DATED this 17th day of September, 2015. 
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